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On August 19, 1981, U.S. F-14 fighter aircraft engaged in combat with
two Libyan Sukhoi-22 fighters above the Gulf of Sidra, approximately
sixty miles off the coast of Libya.' By the end of the encounter, both
Libyan planes had been destroyed and one Libyan pilot killed. According
to Libyan assertions, one of its fighters destroyed one of the U.S. F-14s,
but this contention was denied by the United States. Although Libyan
aircraft had on previous occasions fired upon U.S. military planes,2 the
Gulf of Sidra incident marked the first time that U:S. aircraft returned
fire.
The Gulf of Sidra incident indicates that aerial rules of engagement
formulated by individual states are subject to an identifiable and widely
accepted norm. This norm requires that, in peacetime, military aircraft
attempt to avoid the first use of force during potentially hostile en-
counters with the aircraft of another state. The norm permits a first use
of force only when necessary for immediate unit or national self-defense,
and then usually only after giving warning.
Rules of engagement (ROE) is the general term used to describe the
"directives that a government may establish to delineate the circum-
stances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and air forces
will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces. ' 3
With reference to the particular form of ROE to be discussed in this
Study, the practice followed by most states appears to have consisted in
t A.B., Princeton University, 1982; J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
1. The F-14, or Tomcat, is one of the United States's main tactical fighter aircraft. It can
reach a maximum speed of Mach 2.4 (approximately 1850 miles per hour). The SU-22, or
Fitter, is the export version of the Soviet SU-17 fighter. It can reach a maximum speed of
Mach 2.17 (approximately 1540 miles per hour). Le F-14 et le SU-22: Deux avions dflche
variable, Le Monde, Aug. 21, 1981, at 4, col. 1.
2. See infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
3. Roach, Rules of Engagement, NAVAL WAR C. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 46 (quoting
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 298
(1978)). Roach also notes that ROE reflect the influence of military, political, and diplomatic
factors. Id. at 46-49.
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ordering the intruder to identify itself, turning back or landing at a pre-
scribed place, and, only as a last resort, failing compliance with such
orders, attacking.4 Although ROE are formulated by individual States to
govern their own military operations, it may be assumed that national
ROE are derived with reference to international expectations regarding
appropriate behavior.5
As will be seen in the following discussion of the Gulf of Sidra inci-
dent, the tacit acceptance by international elites of the U.S. application
of its aerial ROE, coupled with an apparent refusal to support the ROE
demonstrated by the Libyans, resulted in a reinforcement of international
normative expectations concerning the appropriate use of force in peace-
time aerial encounters.
II. Facts
The 1981 incident over the Gulf of Sidra was not the first time that
Libyan and U.S. military aircraft had confronted one another in the air-
space near or above the Gulf. On March 21, 1973, Libyan interceptors
fired missiles at a C-130 cargo plane after the latter flew inside a "re-
stricted area" which Libya had created within a one hundred-mile radius
of Tripoli. 6 Some seven years later, on September 16, 1980, Libyan
planes attacked a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. 7 In neither of these cases
4. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL, & VLAsIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 272 (1983).
Yet, as the authors caution, "[t]he practice of states is not, however, uniform and the lack of an
unequivocal community policy affords states a very considerable discretion with respect to
intruders." Id.
5. See, eg., Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and Interna-
tional Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 559 (1953). Lissitzyn identifies "certain standards of interna-
tional law with respect to the treatment of intruding aircraft [into a state's territory] which
may be regarded as established or in the process of being established." Id. at 586. These stan-
dards include the following:
(1) Intruding aircraft must obey all reasonable orders of the territorial sovereign, includ-
ing orders to land, to turn back, or to fly on a certain course ....
(2) The territorial sovereign must not expose the aircraft and its occupants to unneces-
sary or unreasonably great danger-unreasonably great, that is, in relation to the reason-
ably apprehended harmfulness of the intrusion ... .In times of peace, intruding aircraft
whose intentions are known to be harmless must not be attacked even if they disobey
orders to land, to turn back, or to fly on a certain course. . . .In cases where there is
reason to believe that the intruder's intentions may be hostile or illicit, a warning or order
to land should normally be first given and the intruder may be attacked if it disobeys."
Id. at 586-89.
6. The United States had previously communicated its objections to Libya over the crea-
tion of this zone. See Letter Dated June 18, 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, June 20, 1973, U.N. Doc. S/10956 (citing protests made in November 1972 and Feb-
ruary and April 1973). See also DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 302-03 (1973).
7. Libyan Fighters Suspected of Firing on U.S. Aircraft, Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1980, at A17,
col. 1. See also Safire, Looking for Trouble, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1980, at A27, col 1.
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did the Libyan missiles hit their apparent targets, and in neither case did
the U.S. aircraft return fire.8 In addition, the Libyan government has
documented numerous instances of what it termed "[a]ir-space violations
and American terror and spying missions." 9 In none of these claimed
instances, however, did either side resort to the use of force. 10
Although Libya and the U.S. disagree over many of the facts regarding
the August 19, 1981 incident, 1 a rough reconstruction of the incident
can be drawn from those facts agreed upon by both sides. On August 12
and 14, the United States issued warnings to mariners and pilots that it
would hold naval maneuvers and missile tests in the Gulf of Sidra on
August 18 and 19.12 The Gulf had been claimed by Libya since 1973 as
territorial waters, a claim which the United States had expressly refused
to recognize. 13
The maneuvers took place in a hexagonal region, the lower portion of
which crossed the line that Libya claims as the beginning of its territorial
waters (the 32 degrees 30 minutes line of latitude-demarcating the area
where the Gulf meets the Mediterranean-plus a twelve-mile band of
territorial sea).14 The military vessels assigned to participate in the ma-
neuvers were a powerful force, comprising the aircraft carriers Nimitz
and Forrestal, four cruisers, four frigates, four destroyers, and two de-
stroyer escorts. 15 During the first day of the maneuvers, Libyan planes
conducted a number of sorties16 to observe the area of the exercises. In
8. See supra notes 6-7.
9. Letter Dated Aug. 1, 1980 from the Charg6 d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, Aug. 6, 1980, U.N. Doc. S/14094 Annex, at 3-4.
10. Id
11. The two sides disagreed on the extent of U.S. losses. The United States government
stated that it incurred no loss of life or aircraft during the encounter. See U.S. Planes Attacked
by Libyan Aircraft, News Briefing DEP'T ST. BULL.. Oct. 1981, at 58. The Libyan government
claimed that it shot down one U.S. fighter, and that the American plane crashed about ten
miles west of Poisano, Sardinia. See Downed U.S. F-14 Reportedly Fell Near Sardinia, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service [hereinafter cited as FBIS] (No. Africa), Aug. 26, 1981, at Q1
(text from Tripoli, Voice of the Arab Homeland). According to U.S. reports, one of the two
Libyan pilots was killed in the encounter. See To the Shores of Tripoli, Newsweek, Aug. 31,
1981, at 14, 17 (hereinafter cited as To the Shores). The Libyans reported that both pilots
survived. See S. YUSSEF, ARAB-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION OVER SIRT GULF 201 (1981)
(distributed by the Libyan mission to the United Nations).
12. These announcements were made through the official channels of the International
Hydrographic Organization and International Maritime Organization and broadcast over a
designated frequency from Madrid in English and Spanish. Interview, U.S. Department of
Defense Official C, Mar. 29, 1984 (notes on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
13. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
14. See infra map no. 1.
15. To the Shores, supra note 11, at 15.
16. Official and unofficial estimates vary. See Crowell, 45 Libya Incidents Detailed by
Navy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1981, at A10 (45 sorties); To the Shores, supra note 11 at 15 (72
sorties).
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each case, carrier-based U.S. aircraft intercepted the Libyan fighters,
which then turned away. 17
On the morning of August 19, the U.S.S. Nimitz was sailing outside
the Gulf. At the same time, and as they had done the previous day, two
American destroyers cruised below the 32 degrees 30 minutes line, i.e.
within the disputed waters of the Gulf, to -patrol the southern perimeter
of the missile testing area. As in previous sorties, two Libyan SU-22s
took off from their land base and set course toward the testing area. U.S.
F-14s, already in the air, proceeded due south and met the Libyan planes,
then approaching due north, at a point approximately sixty miles from
the Libyan coast.18
At this point, one Libyan SU-22, heading directly toward one of the F-
14s, fired a heat-seeking missile which, according to the U.S. reports of
the incident, missed its target. A Libyan account, however, says that this
missile hit the F-14.19 Both countries agree that the F-14s (numbering
two according to U.S. officials, eight according to at least some Libyan
accounts) after being shot at, maneuvered behind the SU-22s and fired
upon the Libyan planes. 20 Both Libyan planes were destroyed. The en-
tire encounter had lasted about one minute. Immediately thereafter, the
F-14s returned to the carrier Nimitz. The maneuvers ended as sched-
uled at 5:00 P.M. G.M.T. on August 19, without further incident.21
Later that day, the United States filed a protest with the United Na-
tions Security Council, claiming that the incident constituted an unpro-
voked attack by Libya upon aircraft participating in previously
announced exercises in international airspace. 22 Libya formally re-
sponded on August 20, claiming that the U.S. attack on Libyan aircraft
that had been conducting reconnaissance duties in Libyan airspace was a
"provocative terrorist act. ' '23
17. To the Shores, supra note 11 at 16.
18. See id; Neutze, The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A Legal Perspective, 108 PRoc. U.S. NA-
VAL INST. 26 (1982).
19. See S. YUSSEF, supra note 11, at 198-99.
20. See Department Statement, Aug. 19, 1981, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1981, at 58 (two F-
14s); Letter Dated 20 August 1981 from the Charg6 d'Afaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Secur-
ity Council, Aug. 20, 1981, U.N. Doc. S/14636 Annex, at 1 (eight F-14s).
21. U.S. Downs Libyan Fighters Over Mediterranean in Latest Round of Political and Mili-
tary Hostility, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1981, at 3, col. 1; To the Shores, supra note 11 at 18.
22. Letter Dated Aug. 19, 1981 from the Acting Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/14632.
23. U.N. Doc. S/14636, supra note 20.
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III. Conflicting Claims
Not only did Libya and the United States adopt conflicting versions of
the actual engagement, but they also differed concerning the contextual
issues and norms which constituted the factual background out of which
the incident arose. The two primary background norms involved the fol-
lowing issues: 1) the legitimacy of Libya's claim to sovereignty over the
Gulf of Sidra; and 2) the purpose and lawfulness of U.S. maneuvers con-
ducted in the Gulf of Sidra. A brief discussion of each of these back-
ground, or contextual, norms is necessary for a complete understanding
of each side's justification for its use of force in response to actions taken
by the other.24
A. Background Disputes over Norms
1. Dispute over the Sovereignty of the Gulf of Sidra
In October 1973, representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic25 sub-
mitted notes to the United Nations and to the United States and other
nations, officially declaring, for the first time in any international forum,
that the Gulf of Sidra formed "an integral part" of Libyan territory and
was therefore completely subject to Libyan sovereignty as "internal
waters."'26
24. The Gulf of Sidra incident thus involved norms concerning not only aerial engage-
ments, but also territorial waters, the law of the sea, and naval maneuvers. Such an agglomera-
tion of expectations of appropriate behavior will occur in many studies of incidents. Since
space will not allow full treatment of each of these norms, however, this Study confines its
analysis to the rules of aerial engagement.
25. On March 2, 1977, the Libyan government issued the Declaration on the Establish-
ment of the Authority of the People, which changed the name of the state to the Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah.
26. The complete text of the Libyan declaration reads as follows:
The Gulf of Surt located within the territory of the Libyan Arab Republic and sur-
rounded by land boundaries on its East, South, and West sides, and extending North
offshore to Latitude 32 degrees 30 minutes, constitutes an integral part of the Libyan
Arab Republic and is under its complete sovereignty.
As the Gulf penetrates Libyan territory and forms a part thereof, it constitutes internal
waters, beyond which the territorial waters of the Libyan Arab Republic start.
Through history and without any dispute, the Libyan Arab Republic has exercised its
sovereignty over the Gulf. Because of the Gulf's geographical location commanding a
view of the Southern part of the country, it is, therefore, crucial to the security of the
Libyan Arab Republic. Consequently, complete surveillance over its area is necessary to
insure the security and safety of the State.
In view of the aforementioned facts, the Libyan Arab Republic declares that the Gulf of
Surt, defined within the borders stated above, is under its complete national sovereignty
and jurisdiction in regard to legislative, judicial, administrative and other aspects related
to ships and persons that may be present within its limits.
Private and public foreign ships are not allowed to enter the Gulf without prior permis-
sion from the authorities of the Libyan Arab Republic and in accordance with the regula-
tions established by it in this regard.
The Libyan Arab Republic reserves the sovereign rights over the Gulf for its nationals.
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The United States government responded to the Libyan claim in Feb-
ruary 1974. The U.S. found Libya's claim "unacceptable as a violation
of international law," and declared that it "reserve[d] its rights and the
rights of its nationals in the area of the Gulf of [Sidra]."27
If the Gulf were internal waters, Libya would be able, under interna-
tional law, to forbid the conduct of naval maneuvers. 28 On the other
hand, if, as the United States claimed, the Gulf were international wa-
ters, international law would permit overflight and the exercise of other
high seas freedoms, so long as they were carried out "with reasonable
regard to the interests of other states."'29
2. Dispute over the Legitimacy and Purpose of U.S. Maneuvers in
the Gulf
Among the rights which the United States asserted in accordance with
its rejection of the Libyan claim of sovereignty over the Gulf was the
right of its military vessels to enter the area and, in particular, to conduct
naval maneuvers there. For several decades, the Sixth Fleet had sailed in
and out of the Gulf.30 According to a State Department official, the
United States had also conducted naval maneuvers and missile tests in
the Gulf for many years. 31 Between 1977 and 1981, the U.S. Navy con-
ducted eight large-scale maneuvers there.32
After the August 1981 incident, the United States justified its use of
the Gulf for maneuvers on two principal grounds. First, it noted that
international law permits states to use the high seas to conduct naval
maneuvers.33 Second, U.S. officials defended the maneuvers as "rou-
tine," and thus implicitly legitimate. Not only had exercises been con-
In general, the Libyan Arab Republic exercises complete rights of sovereignty over the
Gulf of Surt as it does over any part of the territory of the State.
Libyan Arab Republic Declaration Regarding the Jurisdiction of the Gulf of Surt, Oct. 1973.
27. DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 293-94 (1974) (quoting U.S. reply, dated Feb. 11, 1974).
28. Indeed, if this were the case, Libya could, under international law, deny even innocent
passage to vessels sailing in the Gulf. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter cited as 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty], at art. 17.
29. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314 T.I.A.S. No.
5200, at 10, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 84. [hereinafter cited as 1958 High Seas Treaty]. The 1982 Law
of the Sea Treaty, supra note 28, still in negotiation at the time of the incident, has a similar
provision in Article 87 for high seas freedoms. In a statement made on the day of the incident,
the State Department explicitly relied on these freedoms in asserting:
The oceans beyond the territorial sea are high seas on which all nations enjoy freedom
of navigation and overflight, including the right to engage in naval maneuvers such as
those recently concluded in the Mediterranean.
Department Statement, Aug. 19, 1981, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1981, at 59.
30. Interview, U.S. Department of State Official A, Mar. 27, 1981 (notes on file with the
Yale Journal of International Law).
31. Id.
32. Neutze, supra note 18, at 29.
33. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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ducted in the Gulf many times in the past,34 but also, U.S. officials
claimed, the Gulf was selected primarily on the basis of logistical
factors.35
Other circumstances, however, cast doubt on the purportedly routine,
non-political nature of the 1981 Gulf exercises. The presence of U.S.
vessels in the Gulf is consistent with a longstanding U.S. policy of di-
rectly challenging territorial waters claims that the U.S. refuses to recog-
nize, by sailing American military ships into the claimed areas.36
Moreover, the U.S. decision in the summer of 1981 to conduct maneu-
vers sixty miles off the Libyan coast was also consistent with the open
anti-Qadhafi policy of the Reagan Administration.37 President Reagan
had been quoted in the press on the need to demonstrate U.S. military
might to potential "trouble makers,"' 38 and Secretary of State Alexander
Haig had made it clear that any proposal by the President to "get tough"
with Qadhafi would meet with great favor at the State Department. 39
Furthermore, the U.S. characterization of the maneuvers as strictly
routine is belied by the circumstances under which the decision to hold
them was made. Although such exercises were conducted in the Gulf by
the U.S. in years past, all maneuvers in that area had been suspended by
President Carter during the Iranian hostage crisis, in an effort to avoid
provoking a military response from Libya.4° While the exercises may
once have been routine, the choice to reinitiate them after this hiatus was
34. U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated, "We've had naval and air exer-
cises there before. This one was scheduled for some time, and the notification went out in the
perfectly normal fashion.. . and the exercises took place as scheduled." U.S. Planes Attacked
by Libyan Aircraft: News Briefing, Aug. 16, 1981, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1981, at 58.
35. According to U.S. officials, the low level of civilian air traffic over the Gulf made it "an
ideal location for safe conduct of such an exercise in the Mediterranean." See Neutze, supra
note 18, at 26.
36. This policy was formalized in the late 1970s as the Freedom of Navigation Program.
Interview with Department of State Official A, supra note 30. See also Those Maritime Exer-
cises, Letter to the Editor, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1984, at A22, col. 3 (stating that "the U.S.
Freedom of Navigation Program is nothing more than a routine exercise of generally accepted
maritime rights;" also, referring to Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra as "one of the most
egregious maritime claims existing in the world today") (written by Hugh O'Neill, Representa-
tive for Ocean Policy Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense).
37. In spring 1981, the Reagan Administration ordered the closure of the Libyan Embassy
in Washington. See U.S. Expels Libyans and Closes Mission, Charging Terrorism, N.Y. Times,
May 7, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
38. Transcript of Remarks by President and Laingen at White House, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
1981, at A14, col. 1, 3 (promising "swift and effective retribution to those who violate the
rules of international behavior").
39. See U.S. Pledges to Aid Countries in Africa that Resist Libyans, N.Y. Times, June 3,
1981, at Al, col. 4, A4, col. 4.
40. See US. Downs Libyan fighters over Mediterranean in Latest Round of Political and
Military Hostility, Wall St. J., supra note 21, at 3, col. 1. See also Shootout Over the Med, Time,
Aug. 31, 1981, at 24, 25. (hereinafter cited as Shootout) (noting that in December 1979, one
month after the hostages were taken in Iran, a Libyan mob attacked and burned the U.S.
embassy in Tripoli).
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not. The Reagan Administration itself treated the resumption of the ma-
neuvers as a matter of great political sensitivity, with final approval of the
exercises given by the President himself.41 After the 1981 incident, the
Libyans challenged the American assertions that-the maneuvers were
routine. Libya characterized the exercises as a manifestation by the
United States of its "aggressive intentions against the people of the Lib-
yan Arab Jamahiriya." 42  Furthermore, Libya linked the U.S. maneu-
vers to Egyptian war games allegedly being held along the Libyan-
Egyptian border.43
B. Factual Disputes
According to Libya, the events of August 19 constituted part of a pat-
tern of foreign military threats which had recently been made against it.
Libya claimed that U.S. and Egyptian aircraft had conducted extensive
troop exercises near the Libyan border on the days immediately prior to
the incident.44 On the day of the incident itself:
[f]rom the very early hours of the morning, the Libyan Air Force discov-
ered an unusual density of aircraft in the air space just in the vicinity of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. These appeared to be 36 planes in the operational
zone of Tripoli. Another 36 planes were flying in the operational area of
Benghazi. A further 12 aircraft were flying over Libyan territorial waters,
right in front of the Gulf of Syrte. These were no farther than 100 kms.
from the city of Syrte.45
Libya thus rejected the U.S. claim that the F-14s were performing a rou-
tine intercept, claiming instead that they were part of a large force of
aircraft on a mission of aggression against Libyan territory.
Furthermore, Libya's account of the facts of the aerial incident in the
41. The proposal to reinstitute maneuvers in the Gulf was brought to the National Security
Council (NSC) by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in June 1981. The NSC discussed the
implications of the maneuvers and strongly recommended their approval to the President. See
Why Reagan Set the Tomcats on "The World's Dangerous Man," Sunday Times (London),
Aug. 23, 1981, at 6, col. 2. For normal maneuvers, the final authorization would come from
the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Defense
Department's Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Interview, U.S. Department of State Offi-
cial A, supra note 30.
42. Letter Dated August 20, 1981 from the Charg6 d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mis-
sion of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, Aug. 20, 1981, U.N. Doe. S/14646 Annex, at 1. See also Interview with Mr.
Rajab Azzarouk, Minister Plenipotentiary and Legal Advisor, Libyan Mission to the United
Nations, Apr. 3, 1984 (noting that, if the U.S. had intended only to conduct routine maneu-
vers, it could easily have chosen a less sensitive location) (notes on file with the Yale Journal of
International Law).
43. Kifner, Tripoli in a Protest Note Accuses U.S. of "International Terrorism," N.Y.
Times, Aug. 20, 1981, at A12, col. 1.
44. Id.
45. S. YussEF, supra note 11, at 198 (1982).
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Gulf diverges sharply from that of the United States. According to the
most complete Libyan account available, 4 6 events unfolded as follows. At
7 A.M. on August 19, two Libyan fighters were sent to intercept a forma-
tion of eight U.S. aircraft headed for the Libyan city of Sidra. The Libyan
planes encountered two planes from the U.S. formation "at a relatively
close distance from the city of Syrte." 47 The Libyan pilots were sur-
prised to find the U.S. aircraft "fully prepared for an attack. '48 After the
U.S. aircraft attempted to maneuver behind the Libyan fighters, one Lib-
yan pilot fired a missile which succeeded in destroying one of the U.S.
planes. Then finding themselves surrounded by the six other aircraft of
the U.S. formation, the Libyan pilots ejected. Libya asserts that both
survived.49
IV. Conflicting Conceptions of Lawfulness
Both the Libyan and American governments justified the actions of
their pilots in terms comporting with general principles governing the
appropriate use of force in peacetime aerial encounters. Each side charac-
terized its pilots' actions as defensive. The United States claimed that its
use of force was a justified response to being fired upon.50 Libya at first
asserted that its pilot fired only as a matter of unit self-defence after first
being fired upon by the U.S. planes.5 1 Later, Libya claimed that its pi-
lots' initiation of force was a necessary act of national self-defense against
a clear threat to Libyan territory.52 While each side sought to character-
ize its own actions as purely defensive and therefore lawful, each labelled
the actions of the other as unlawful aggression.
The conflicting conceptions of lawfulness demonstrated in the Gulf of
Sidra incident do not appear to have involved a dispute as to the general
content of the international norms which govern the ROE practiced by
individual states. Rather, the legal dispute seems to have centered on
what behavior constitutes a communication of hostile intent sufficient to
justify a defensive use of force.
46. See S. YUSSEF, supra note 11.
47. Id. at 199-200.
48. Id. at 200.
49. Id. at 200-01.
50. See US. Planes Attacked by Libyan Aircraft, News Briefing, supra note 11, at 57-58.
51. Shootout, supra note 40, at 25.
52. Le colonel Kadhafi reconnait que les avions libyens ont tird les premiers, Le Monde,
Aug. 25, 1981, at 4, col. 1 (hereinafter cited as Le colonel Kadhafi). This article also reported
the Libyan leader's statement that a warning was given before the Libyan pilot fired. This
prior warning claim was not, however, repeated in later Libyan accounts. See, e.g., S. Yus-
SEF, supra note 11.
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A. American Conceptions of the Right of Peacetime Self-Defense
The specific content of U.S. ROE for peacetime aerial encounters is
classified; nevertheless, its general contours may be ascertained from
known U.S. practice. The appropriate initial response for a U.S. fighter
encountering a foreign aircraft on an apparently hostile mission would be
to approach the aircraft, ask it to identify itself, and order it to leave the
area. The U.S. plane would then wiggle its wings in an international sig-
nal to move off. If, after receiving warning, the foreign craft did not
comply, and if its apparent mission threatened a U.S. target, the U.S.
plane would be authorized to shoot it down. U.S. peacetime ROE thus
contemplate a first use of force against an apparently hostile foreign air-
craft which refuses, after being warned, to turn away from a U.S.
target.5 3
The ROE used during the Gulf incident would therefore have included
provisions allowing the initiation of the use of force when attempts at
peaceful communication had failed to eliminate an imminent physical
threat to U.S. vessels. Furthermore, under U.S. ROE, if a foreign aircraft
fires at a U.S. aircraft, U.S. pilots may be authorized to return fire and
take the measures necessary to eliminate the immediate threat posed, in-
cluding destroying the attacking aircraft. 54
53. See Roach, supra note 3, at 49. In formulating its current ROE, the United States may
also have relied on normative expectations derived from the practice followed in previous en-
counters with Soviet or East European fighters. For example, during the early 1950s, Soviet or
East European military aircraft shot at U.S. fighters at least six times. See Lissitzyn, supra
note 5, at 574-85. The United States claimed in each instance that the aircraft had not violated
Warsaw Pact airspace and that the planes had been attacked for no reason. The Soviet Union,
on the other hand, claimed that U.S. aircraft had entered Warsaw Pact airspace. Most impor-
tant, the Soviets always claimed that the U.S. pilots had fired first:
The striking fact is that the Soviet Government has in no case claimed the right to open
fire on an intruding aircraft without warning, but alleged in most of these cases that the
intruders had been the first to open fire. In some cases where this was not alleged, the
Soviet fighter was said to have opened fire by way of warning only. The Soviet Govern-
ment, moreover, has sought to emphasize its contention that the instructions to Soviet
airmen on the treatment of intruders are similar to those in force in other countries.
Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
While the frequency of hostile encounters between Soviet and U.S. aircraft has greatly de-
creased since that time, the basic norms against firing first appear to have endured. Thus,
Soviet and American military pilots today habitually observe one another over certain areas
above the high seas, following a peculiar form of etiquette to ensure the other side that its
intentions are not hostile. See Honan, The Games Pilots Play Over the Mediterranean, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1981, at D2, col. 3. See also Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On
and Over the High Seas [U.S. - U.S.S.R.], 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. No. 7379 (1972) (requiring
non-interference by aircraft of one state with naval maneuvers conducted by the other).
54. In addition to the self-defense requirement, U.S. peacetime ROE is further moderated
by requirements that any use of force in a peacetime military encounter be governed by the
principles of necessity and proportionality. Necessity implies the use of force only when other
methods cannot defuse a threat; proportionality requires a military decision-maker to respond
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In other circumstances U.S. officials could have instructed their pilots
to follow an "escape at all costs" rule. Although such an instruction
would have decreased the possibility of a combat encounter between Lib-
yan and American forces, U.S. officials believed that a refusal to allow
forcible unit self-defense would have signalled acquiescence in Qadhafi's
claims over the Gulf.55
Thus, in justifying the behavior of its military personnel during the
incident, the U.S. relied upon its conception of a peacetime self-defense
norm which would allow pilots flying over international waters to fire
when fired upon by aircraft from a potentially hostile state. U.S. officials
also appeared to acknowledge implicitly the legal force of a claim that
the presence of their naval forces in the Gulf did not comport with inter-
national norms of non-aggressiveness. In their statements after the inci-
dent, U.S. officials were careful to emphasize the routine nature of the
maneuvers, to state that they were held in international waters, and to
omit any reference to political motivations or an intent to make a sym-
bolic demonstration of force. In other words, the U.S. officials sought to
say nothing that might lend credence to a Libyan assertion that the pres-
ence of American air and naval vessels presented a real threat to Libyan
sovereign territory.
The United States, both in its actions during the incident and in its
later justifications, indicated its conception of an international norm of
self-defense relating to peacetime aerial encounters that would allow the
use of force only as a response to the actual use of force by the other side
or to a threat of imminent attack, but not as a response, particularly if
made without warning, to a symbolic threat.
B. Libyan Conceptions of the Right of Peacetime Self-Defense
After studying the incident, many U.S. officials came to believe that
the firing of the first shot by the Libyan pilot was the result of simple
pilot error, rather than a- manifestation of Libyan ROE.56 Nonetheless,
with no more that that amount of force needed to eliminate the threat. See Roach, supra note
3, at 49.
55. Interview, U.S. Department of Defense Official A, supra note 30.
56. The "pilot error" theory is based on three facts. First, the Libyans had not fired dur-
ing previous sorties. Second, the SU-22, an old Soviet warplane, is not Libya's ideal intercep-
tor aircraft. Had the Libyan high command intended to shoot down an F-14, it should have
sent a more sophisticated craft, such as a MIG-23, to perform the mission. Finally, if the
Libyans had instructed their pilot to shoot down the U.S. plane, he must have been grossly
incompetent, since the missile was fired from the wrong direction. The missile fired from the
Libyan plane was a heat-seeking missile, which must be directed toward the rear of an aircraft
in order to home in on the plane's heat source, its exhaust. Thus, the pilot's firing at the front
of an aircraft would seem to indicate either tactical incompetence, or that the shot was fired in
panic or through some other error. See Interview, Department of Defense Official D, Mar. 30,
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the Libyans themselves refused to characterize the attack upon the U.S.
aircraft as a mistake, and consistently justified the event as necessary for
national self-defense. Therefore, no matter what the actual motivations of
the Libyan pilot may have been, the official justifications given for his
action may be evaluated as assertions by Libya of a right of self-defense
under the circumstances as Libya believed them to be.
One of the self-defense claims advanced by Libya was based on its
claim of sovereignty over the Gulf,57 and thus implied an assertion that
the right of first use of force may be triggered by any breach of territorial
space by foreign craft. According to an American military authority,
however, Libya had no right under international law to use force with-
out first attempting to escort the intruding forces from claimed territory
or requesting the United Nations Security Council to effect such
removal.58
Libya did not, however, rely exclusively on the claim of territorial
breach as justification for its first use of force, but rather used that argu-
ment primarily as support for its larger claim that the U.S. fleet and
planes were in position for an imminent raid upon the northern parts of
its country.5 9 With this assertion, Libya could justify any failure to use
warning manuevers, 6° to escort U.S. craft out of claimed areas, or to
apply to the Security Council for their removal, on the basis of the need
to act immediately to defend its territory against an impending attack.
According to the most detailed Libyan account available of the inci-
dent, their belief that U.S. forces were prepared for immediate attack was
based on the American forces having breached a pre-determined Libyan
"Line of Engagement," set at the boundary of Libya's claimed territorial
waters. 61 Once foreign forces entered this area, they would be warned to
proceed no further. Should the warning not be heeded, the local military
commander was authorized shoot down the intruder. In addition,
should the foreign craft proceed within the Gulf and enter a zone desig-
nated as the "Confrontation Area," military personnel would be required
1984 (notes on fie with the Yale Journal of International Law). But see Sunday Times
(London), supra note 41, at 6 (concluding that the pilot's firing in the wrong direction indi-
cated not pilot error, but rather that the U.S. planes had lured the Libyans into a trap).
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
58. See Neutze, supra note 18, at 30. According to a U.S. military source, Algeria once
escorted U. S. warships out of claimed Algerian waters and the U.S. did not resist. Interview,
Department of State Official A, supra note 30.
59. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
60. Some earlier Libyan accounts did contend that a warning was given before firing. See,
eg., Le colonel Kadhafi, supra note 52, at 4, col 1. However, the U.S. disputes this contention,
which was omitted from later accounts. See U.S. Planes Attacked by Libyan Aircraft: News
Briefing, supra note 11 (no warning given); S. YUSSEF, supra note 11.
61. S. YUSSEF, supra note 11, at 189-90.
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to act immediately to destroy the intruder. The "Confrontation Area"
concept appears to be based on the belief that once this point was
reached, Libya's national security would require the presumption that
any intruding aircraft was on an attack mission, since it would be travel-
ling so quickly that any delay-including attempts to ascertain intent, or
to peaceably warn off the aircraft-would allow a hostile craft to reach
and destroy its target unhindered. 62
Such pre-determined security lines, located within a specified distance
of a country's shores, are used by a number of states, including the
United States and the Soviet Union. However, unlike Libya, these states
give notice to the international community of the existence of lines be-
yond which the state will presume the existence of a threat to its secur-
ity.63 The general practice of states appears to be to warn foreign forces
of the intent which will be attributed to their actions should they breach
these lines.
The practice of maintaining a predetermined and publicized coastal
security line appears more consistent than the Libyan practice with the
general norm governing the use of peacetime ROE, which emphasizes
attempts at peaceful resolution of incidents, reserving the use of force as
a last resort of immediate defensive necessity. Libya's actions in the inci-
dent over the Gulf of Sidra demonstrated a readiness to use force at an
earlier point than either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., and may be viewed as
asserting a broader conception of the right to the defensive use of force
than that apparently held by either superpower.64
V. International Appraisal
The international community responded quickly to the Gulf of Sidra
aerial incident. A number of international commentators criticized the
U.S. presence in the area, characterizing the maneuvers and exercises as
a dangerously provocative show of strength. 65 On the whole, however,
62. Id. at 197.
63. See, e.g., Security Control of Air Traffic, 14 C.F.R. § 99 (1984) (describing U.S. air
defense zones); Jet Navigation Chart J.N.C.-5 (Defense Mapping Agency, 1973) (showing So-
viet Union's "Asian Coastal Buffer Zone").
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. See also discussion of U.S.- U.S.S.R. aerial
ROE, supra note 53.
65. With respect to the legitimacy of the U.S. exercises, most international commentators
took the view that the U.S. acted unwisely in provoking the incident. See, e.g., FRG: Papers
View Effects of US. Libyan Air Clash, FBIS (W. Eur.), Aug. 21, 1981, at J3 (text from the
Frankfurter Rundschau) ("One can surely contest [unreasonable claims over international wa-
ters] without hseitation [sic]. It is more than questionable, however, whether it must be done as
[the U.S.] did [by holding] maneuvers off Libya's coast."); Rattner, Western Europeans Ex-
pressing Favor and Unease, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1981, at A10 (officials in the U.K, France,
Germany, and Italy expressing the belief that the U.S. had deliberately invited the incident);
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the international community accepted the legality of the U.S. pilots' re-
turn of force during the incident itself, and most of those commentators
who were critical of the maneuvers offered no criticism of the pilots' ac-
tions in firing back.66 This international reaction indicates the separabil-
ity of the norms relating to the right of a superpower to conduct naval
maneuvers in or near the disputed territory of a hostile state, and the
norms regulating the defensive use of force by a military aircraft which is
being fired upon.
On the other hand, the international community generally supported
neither Libya's claim to the Gulf as internal waters67 nor its attempt to
Turkey: Press Reaction to US.-Libyan Incident, FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 28, 1981, at T5 (ask-
ing how the U.S. would react to Soviet exercises in the Gulf of Mexico). Many Third World
states als9 strongly condemned the U.S. See Daily Report: Middle East and South Asia Review,
Libyan-US. Clash, FBIS (Mid-East), Aug. 24, 1981, at 1 (Organization of African Unity
denounced U.S. for promoting the "policy of cowboys" in a "wanton act of aggression" consti-
tuting a "provocative act of undeclared war."); Pravda Comments on Sidra Incident, Views
Reaction, FBIS (USSR), Aug. 26, 1981, at N6 (excerpted by Pravda from La Presse de
Tunisie) (The Islamic Conference stated that "the U.S. 'muscle-flexing' policy jeopardiz[ed]
peace. . . throughout the world," and was a policy based on disregard for the norms of inter-
national law.) No state other than Libya, however, see supra note 23, lodged any formal pro-
test challenging the maneuvers' legality. A distinct minority of commentators unreservedly
praised the U.S. show of force in the maneuvers. See, eg., UK: Telegraph Praises U.S. Re-
sponse to Libyans, FBIS (W. Eur.), Aug. 27, 1981, at Q1 (excerpt from the Daily Telegraph
(London)).
66. See, eg., Rattner, supra note 65; But see Libya's Larger Meaning, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, Aug. 21, 1981, at 24 (editorial questioning whether the U.S. pilots could have taken eva-
sive action, especially in light of previous non-violent episodes); FRG: Papers View Effects of
US.-Libyan Air Crash, FBIS (W. Eur.), Aug. 21, 1981, at 3 (text from Frankfurter Rund-
schau) ("It is also feasible that the attacked American pilots fired their rockets too quickly to
tell [the Libyan pilots] what is what in the American way."). A few commentators character-
ized the return of fire by the U.S. as unlawful. See Bahrain: Paper Scorns Reagan Justification
of Libyan Clash, FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 24, 1981, at C1 (describing the U.S. attack as indi-
cating that "the only law Reagan respects is the law of the jungle and the law of the gun");
Turkey: Press Reaction to U.S.-Libyan Incident, FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 28, 1981, at T5 (text
from Hurriyet) ("it is impossible to justify the shooting down of planes"); Pravda Comments
on Sidra Incident, Views Reaction, FBIS (USSR) Aug. 24, 1981, at N6 (denouncing the "U.S.
Air Force's piratical attack on Libyan aircraft"). See also Letter to the Editor, PROC. U.S.
NAVAL INST., May 1982, at 42 (written by Lieutenant Joseph R. McFaul, U.S. Coast Guard,
arguing that even if the U.S. fleet was in international waters at the time of the incident, the
U.S. may have violated international law by firing upon the Libyan planes: "The United States
cannot claim self-defense if the Libyan attack had no chance of success. Considering [the
technological superiority of the F-14s over the export version SU-22s] U.S. action was only
retaliation, not self-defense. . . . [In addition, because this was] a peacetime incident, there
[was] no justification for shooting down the second plane").
67. Only a few international actors supported Libya's claim to sovereignty over the Gulf.
See World Peace Council Denounces U.S. Aggression, FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 21, 1981, at Al
(text from Tripoli Domestic Service) (denouncing U.S. aggression against Libyan aircraft
within Libyan airspace and territorial waters as part of an imperialist plot aimed against the
Libyan Arab People); Palestinian Reaction to U.S.-Libyan Dogfight. As-Sa'iquah Support,
FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 21, 1981, at A2 (text from Tripoli JANA) (condemnation by Palestin-
ian organization of U.S. actions against Libyan planes within Libyan airspace and territorial
waters). The League of Arab States skirted the issue by noting only that the maneuvers oc-
curred "near Libyan shores." News Release, League of Arab States, Office of the Permanent
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characterize its first-use position as a necessary defensive response to the
situation.68
The failure of international elites to condemn the American response
constitutes an enforcement of the normative expectations concerning
peacetime ROE. The failure to condemn directly Libya's attack does
not, however, imply approval of the Libyan ROE as being consistent
with international norms. The United States, in returning fire, asserted
its view of acceptable behavior. The encounter ended at that point, with-
out any further retaliatory assertion of Libyan norms. By accepting the
outcome of the incident, i.e. the American "victory," international elites
reinforced the norm as applied by the United States but not as applied by
Libya. This acceptance may be seen as reflecting a consensus among
states that the norms governing ROE include both the right to return fire
if attacked and the duty to warn intruders before firing upon them.
VI. Outcome
The decision of the international community in response to the inci-
dent was, in effect, to treat the matter as closed. There were no attempts
to characterize the incident as an ongoing dispute in need of resolution,
nor did any elites make efforts to censure either actor, or otherwise
change their behavior toward either party. Elites may have decided that
their best response lay simply in hoping that the two adversaries would
Observer to the United Nations, Aug. 19, 1981. Comments by the Soviet government used
similarly tentative language. See, e.g., U.S. Naval Maneuvers, Libyan Incident Condemned,
FBIS (USSR), Aug. 21, 1981, at HI ("in the immediate vicinity of the Libyan coast"); id. at H2
("according to Tripoli radio, this attack occurred in the airspace over Libyan territorial wa-
ters"); Pravda Comments on Sidra Incident, Views Reaction, FBIS (USSR), Aug. 26, 1981, at
H6 ("on the approaches to Libya's shores"). See also FRG: Papers View Effects of U.S.-Lib-
yan Air Crash, FBIS (W. Eur.), Aug. 21, 1981, at J3 (text from Frankfurter Rundschau) (not-
ing that "most people did not take [Libya's 1973 claim of a 200-mile territorial waters zone
along its coast] very seriously" since it "would include the Greek island of Crete as well as
independent Malta").
68. While many commentators criticized the maneuvers by the U.S. as unwise or insti-
gatory, they did not argue that Libya was therefore justified in asserting as a necessary defen-
sive measure an initiation of force in response to a symbolic show of strength. But cf. Turkey:
Press Reaction to US.-Libyan Incident, FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 28, 1981, at T4 (commenting
that Libya was justified in considering the maneuvers to be provocative, implying that there-
fore the U.S. should not have been surprised at the Libyan response). See also Palestinian
Reaction to US.-Libyan Dogfight: Arafat Message, FBIS (No. Africa) Aug. 21, 1981, at AI
(text from Tripoli Voice of Arab Homeland) (PLO leader praising shooting at "American
forces, enemies of the people"). A few commentators directly condemned the Libyan resort to
force as a violation of international law. See Gunfight, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1981, at A28, col.
1 (characterizing the act as typical of a lawless regime); Daily Report: Middle East and South
Asia Review, Libyan-U.S. Clash, FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 24, 1981, at 2 (Egyptian President
Anwar el-Sadat criticizes Qadhafi for causing the incident, saying that the Libyan leader de-
served to be executed for the "foolish act" in which heavy and unwieldy Sukhois took on the
U.S. planes).
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work out their differences and create an atmosphere in which such an
incident would not recur. The decision by international elites not to take
more assertive action to resolve the dispute indicates that they concluded
that their public pronouncements constituted sufficient means to enforce
the norms governing ROE. Further action to support those norms, such
as strong countermeasures against one side, or sorties into the Gulf to see
what would happen in another case, would clearly have been counter-
productive, particularly in light of Libya's decision to limit its losses and
not to seek a continuation of the hostilities.
Furthermore, after making their initial formal representations to the
UN Security Council,69 neither Libya nor the United States requested
any further action.70 The United States has continued to hold maneu-
vers in waters near the coasts of both friendly and hostile states and to
challenge, through the presence of U.S. vessels or aircraft, other states'
territorial claims to waters which it regards as international. 71
It is not known to what extent, if any, Libya has modified its ROE to
redefine the point at which it will presume that its territory is in such
imminent danger of attack as to require the immediate defensive use of
force. Since the incident, however, Libya has not attempted any similar
actions against any aircraft, including those of the United States, flying
over the Gulf of Sidra.72
In sum, insofar as the norms governing the application of ROE in ae-
rial encounters are concerned, the lack of further action implies that
elites in the United States, Libya, and the international community de-
cided that their public pronouncements, coupled with the actual outcome
of the incident, were sufficient means of enforcing these norms. Resort to
action may simply not have been perceived as either necessary or produc-
tive under the circumstances.
VII. Writer's Appraisal
The reinforcement by the United States and other international actors
of existing norms governing the peacetime application of ROE for mili-
tary aircraft, coupled with the apparent acquiescence of Libya, has
ramifications for the stability and predictability of peacetime military be-
havior. Thus, regardless of which side's version of the facts one adopts-
69. See supra notes 22-23.
70. The United States may have declined to do so both because of the probability of a
Soviet veto and out of a desire to avoid a protracted discussion of U.S. military policy.
71. See supra note 36.
72. Flights Over the Gulf of Sidra: U.S. Navy Jets Challenge Libyan Sovereignty Claim,
Wash. Post, July 27, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
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both with respect to background facts and the facts of the incident it-
self-certain conclusions emerge.
The acceptance of a norm setting strict defensive limits upon the
peacetime use of force against potentially hostile aircraft promotes world
public order by discouraging unwarranted deployments of force. The re-
action to the incident indicates both that the use of force will be seen as
justifying a limited return of force, and that states should be cautious
about initiating defensive attacks against foreign aircraft - even if those
aircraft are located over disputed waters over which a coastal state be-
lieves itself to have a strong claim. The tacit reinforcement by interna-
tional elites of the norms regarding the appropriate and inappropriate
defensive uses of force in peacetime promotes the basic norms of both
Articles 2(4)73 and 5174 of the United Nations Charter, by reinforcing
expectations that military aircraft may initiate a limited defensive use of
force, but only when confronted with a bona fide danger either to them-
selves or to their national territory.
Yet, the reinforcement of this general norm governing aerial engage-
ment may also have negative consequences for public order by demon-
strating a possible flaw in the norm itself. The Gulf of Sidra incident
shows that, while certain states with well-established air forces have for-
mulated sophisticated ROE which they are able to apply in a manner
consistent with international norms, other states may not fully under-
stand the norms, or be capable of assuring their consistent application.
These newcomers to the "game" of peaceful military encounters may
lack the requisite experience to distinguish between symbolic and actual
threats to national security, or to appreciate the possibilities for appar-
ently peaceful maneuvers adequately to convey a "force" intention. The
change in Libya's account of the incident, for example, may indicate its
uncertainty as to appropriate invocations of the general norms concern-
ing aerial rules of engagement. The enforcement of a norm which certain
states may not easily grasp may prove counterproductive to world order
if it fails to secure a uniformity of expectations regarding appropriate
actions and responses.
It is to be hoped, instead, that such reinforcement will function as a
catalyst to encourage all states to accept the international norms and for-
73. "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
74. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity... ." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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mulate ROE consistent with them. Although the norms governing appli-
cation of ROE may appear complex to certain actors, they clearly offer
greater stability than such alternatives as allowing states to fire at will on
nearby foreign aircraft, or disallowing the use of self-defense in hostile
encounters. While the incident which occurred in the Gulf of Sidra may
have caused increased tension, at least temporarily, between the United
States and Libya, the reinforcement of the norms governing rules of en-
gagement should contribute to an atmosphere of greater stability for fu-
ture military exercises.
